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Abstract
This research is motivated by the existence of fraud phenomenon that still occurs
in sharia banking environment which in fact is based on Islamic principles in every
activity. Based on data from ACFE (Association Of Certified Fraud Examiners) in
2016 shows that banks and financial institutions are the highest entities in the case
of fraud. Sharia principles that are run by Islamic banks do not necessarily make
Islamic banks to avoid fraud cases. Cases of fraud that many overwrite Islamic banks
may be due to weak implementation of sharia corporate governance. The data
in this research is obtained from Good Corporate Governance of syariah banking
(BUS-UUS) period 2012-2016 using a quantitative approach. The result of research
shows that the implementation of sharia corporate governance in syariah banking
is categorized into three parts that are very good, good and good enough but from
the implementation of sharia corporate governance is still not able to prevent fraud
in sharia banking. This study has important implications, namely sharia banking must
be balanced with the ability of good human resources because Islamic banks is
a banking business that combines the principles of banking and Islamic principles.
In addition, organizational culture and tone at the top can also be a lock to prevent fraud,
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1. Introduction
Apart from the development of Islamic banking, there are serious things that must be
faced by every bank, both conventional and Islamic banks. This is in the form of fraud
that occurs in the banking environment. Those who commit fraud are not foreigners
but internal parties of the bank itself. Actors of bank crimes can be carried out by all
parties ranging from employees to the top management of the bank (Anugerah, 2014).
The following are parties who are vulnerable to bank crime. The following are parties
who are vulnerable to bank crime:
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Figure 1: Fraud Actors Suspected of Bank Crimes (Source: (Laporan Profil Industri Perbankan
Triwulan IV, 2016)).
Based on ACFE data (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners) in 2016 shows
that banks and financial institutions are the highest entities in the Fraud case. Sharia
principles run by Islamic banks do not necessarily make Islamic banks avoid fraud
cases. Evidenced by the emergence of fraud cases involving Islamic bank entities, as
in the corruption case of Bank Jabar Banten Syariah (BJBS) where the executor (Acting)
President Director of BJBS initials YG became a suspect in the alleged corruption of
the provision of fictitious credit given to debtors on behalf of PT. Hastuka Sarana Karya
for the period of 2014 to 2016 (Sohuturon, 2017).
The number of fraud phenomena that occur in Islamic banking clearly contradicts to
QS. Al-Anfal: 27 which states the humans are not allowed to commit treason
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Meaning: O who believe, do not betray Allah and the Messenger (Muham-
mad) and (also) do not betray the messages entrusted to you, while you
know (QS. Al-anfal: 27).
Fraud cases that afflict many Islamic banks may be due to the weak implemen-
tation of sharia corporate governance. This is because the implementation of sharia
corporate governance is an important requirement in ensuring the development and
stability of the Islamic financial industry (Grassa, 2015). Several studies on Islamic bank
governance have been carried out, such as Maradita’s (2014) research which compares
the governance characteristics of Islamic banks and conventional banks, in addition
to the research conducted by Junusi (2012) in which research discusses how the
implementation of sharia governance to reputation and the trust of Islamic banks. The
results of Junusi’s research (2012) state that corporate governance sharia will affect
customer reputation and trust. Asrori (2014) in his research on the implementation of
Islamic corporate governance and its implications for the performance of Islamic banks
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states that the implementation of Islamic corporate governance has a positive effect on
the performance of Islamic banks.
From the above problems, the authors formulated several research formulas, namely
the extent of fraud in Islamic banking in Indonesia, how the implementation of sharia
corporate governance in Indonesia, and whether sharia corporate governance affects
fraud prevention. The purpose of this research is to find out the extent a fraud that occurs
in Islamic banking in Indonesia, to know the extent of sharia corporate governance
implementation in Islamic banking, and to know the extent to which sharia corporate
governance can influence fraud prevention. The author gives the hypothesis for this
study is that sharia corporate governance affects fraud prevention at Islamic banks.
Based on the problems described above, the authors feel the need to conduct
research on, ”Prevention of Fraud on Islamic Banking in Indonesia through the Imple-
mentation of Sharia Corporate Governance”
2. Literature Study
2.1. Sharia corporate governance
IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board) defines sharia corporate governance, namely the
sharia system which must refer to a series of institutional and organizational arrange-
ments that have been made by IIFS (Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services).
This IIFS ensures effective independent oversight of sharia compliance from each of
the following process structures:
1. Issuance of sharia statements/decisions;
2. Dissemination of information regarding sharia resolution to IIFS members who
monitor compliance from each level of operations and transactions;
3. Review of internal/audit sharia compliance to record non-compliance and if possi-
ble will be handled and corrected;
4. Sharia compliance/audit review in the form of an annual report to verify that the
review of internal/audit sharia compliance has been carried out appropriately and
the findings have been recorded by the sharia board (Mizushima, 2014).
To implement sharia corporate governance, it is necessary to have a Sharia Supervi-
sory Board (DPS) which functions in processing supervision, monitoring, auditing, and
providing opinions on sharia compliance in financial institutions or companies offering
sharia products and services (Novela, 2015).
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Sharia corporate governance comes from Islamic law. The aim of sharia corporate
governance is not only to work for the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders, but
also to work to fulfill its obligations as a servant of God (Hassan, 2014).
2.2. Fraud
Fraud, in general, can be interpreted by human intelligence or someone can plan to gain
profit through the wrong picture (Suprajadi, 2009). Fraud is one of the many problems
in the business world today. Moreover, the high level of fraud in the banking sector has
become a global phenomenon that requires urgent solutions (Ali Danlandi Yusuf, 2016).
Table 1: Differences in the Concept of Good Corporate Governance and Sharia Corporate Governance.
No Aspect principles of good corporate
governance
Islamic principles




Promotion of transparent and
efficient markets with rule of law
and division of responsibilities
• Promotion of business within
ethical framework of Shariah
• Believes in profit and loss
• Primacy of Justice and social
welfare with social and spiritual
obligations
• Prohibition of interest
2 The rights of
shareholders and key
ownership functions
• Basic shareholder rights • Property as trust from God
• Participation in Decision-making
at the general meetings
• Sole Authority is God
• Structures and arrangements
markets for corporate control
• Society as stakeholders
• Ownership rights by all
shareholders including institutional
shareholders
• Accountability not only to
stakeholders but also to God, the
ultimate owner






• Protection to minority and
foreign shareholders
• Just and fairness of value
• Equitable distribution of wealth
to all stakeholders and
disadvantages members in the
form of Zakat and Sadqa
• Social and individual welfare with
both spiritual and moral obligation
• Sensation of Equality
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No Aspect principles of good corporate
governance
Islamic principles
4 The role of
stakeholders in
corporate governance
• In creating wealth, jobs and
sustainability of financially sound
enterprises
• Islamic accountability to Falah
and social welfare orientation
• Haram/Halal dichotomy in
transaction
• Social & individual welfare from
both spiritual and material




• Matters regarding corporation • Accountability with Shariah
compliance
• Financial situation • Socio-economic objectives
related to firms’ control and
accountability to all its
stakeholders
• Performance, ownership and
governance
• Justice, equality, truthfulness
transparency
6 The responsibilities of
the board
•   Strategic guidance • Accountability not only to
company or board or stakeholders
but also to Allah the ultimate
authority who leads to welfare and
success
•   Monitoring of management • Holistic and integrative guidance
•   Accountability to company and
stakeholders
• Negotiation and co-operation
• Consultation and consensus
seeking for each decision with
related stakeholders
Source: (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009)
According to Bank Indonesia Circular No. 13/28/DPNP referred to as fraud is an act of
irregularity or omission that is intentionally carried out to deceive, or manipulate banks,
customers, or other parties, which occur in the bank and/or use bank facilities so as
to cause banks, customers, or other parties suffer losses and/or fraud players obtain
financial benefits both directly and indirectly (Bank Indonesia Circular No. 13/28/DPNP,
2011).
2.3. Fraud triangle
The Fraud triangle concept was developed in 1950 by Donald Cressey, a criminologist.
He explored the study of the reasons behind those who cheated. He researched 250
criminals who committed fraud within 5 months. Based on his research, he concluded
that people cheated for two things, first because they were trusted to hold responsibility
and the second because of circumstances that made them violate that belief. According
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to Cressey, there are 3 factors behind someone cheating, namely (1) pressure, (2)
opportunity, (3) rationalization (Mansor, 2015).
Figure 2: Fraud Triangle (Source: (Mansor, 2015)).
3. Research Methods
The method used in this study is to use a quantitative approach. The research design
used in this study is causality design which is research aimed at finding explanations
in the form of causal relationships between several concepts or several variables
(Ferdinand, 2014). So there are variables that influence (independently) and variables
that affected (dependent). The object of research that will be examined in this study
consists of one variable X namely sharia corporate governance and Y variable that
is fraud. Sharia Corporate Governance is measured by 11 indicators that have been
determined by Bank Indonesia circular letter No.12/13/DPBS, 2010, then the author
gives a score of 1 if the item is mentioned in the GCG report and gives a score of 0 if
the item is not mentioned in the GCG report.
Table 2: Scale and Suitability Rating of Indicators.
Rating The Scale of Compliance With Indicators
1 Very suitable if it meets 87.5% to 100% of the total indicator
2 Appropriate if it meets 62.5% to 87.4% of the total indicators
3 Quite appropriate if it meets 37.5% to 62.4% of the total indicators
4 Not suitable if it meets 12.5% to 37.4% of the total indicators
5 Not suitable if it meets 0% to 12.4% of the total indicators
Source: (Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No.12/13/ DPbs, 2010)
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To measure the quality of sharia governance implementation, the rating is multiplied
by the weight for which the conditions are:
Table 3: Weight of each factor.
No Factor Quality (%)
1 Implementation of the duties and responsibilities of the
Board of Commissioners
12.50
2 Implementation of the duties and responsibilities of the
Board of Directors
17.50
3 Completeness and implementation of committee duties 10.00
4 Implementation of the duties and responsibilities of the
sharia supervisory board
10.00
5 Implementation of Sharia Principles in the activities of
collecting and distributing funds and services
5.00
6 Handling conflicts of interest 10.00
7 Implementation of the Bank’s compliance function 5.00
8 Application of internal audit function 5.00
9 Application of external audit function 5.00
10 Maximum Fund Channels 5.00
11 Transparency of financial and non-financial conditions,
GCG implementation reports and internal reporting
15.00
TOTAL 100.00
Source: (Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No.12/13/ DPbs, 2010)
The results of the ranking multiplier with the composite value can be classified as
the value of the quality of the implementation of sharia governance with the following
conditions:
Table 4: Composite Predicate Values.
Composite Value Composite Predicate
Composite Value < 1.5 Very good
1.5 ≤ Composite Value < 2.5 Good
2.5 ≤ Composite Value < 3.5 Acceptable
3.5 ≤ Composite Value < 4.5 Poor
4.5 ≤ Composite Value ≤ 5 Very Poor
Source: (Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No.12/13/ DPbs, 2010)
The sample in this study is all BUS and UUS in Indonesia from 2012-2016. The
sample selection method in this study uses saturated samples, namely sampling where
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all members of the population are used as a sample, this is done because the population
is relatively small (Agung, 2012). The samples used in this study are as follows:
3.1. Data analysis technique
The data analysis technique used in this study is the analysis of the influence test
through a panel data regression test. Panel data regression test analysis was conducted
because in this study combining time series data and cross-section into one observation.
Panel data is a combination of the cross section with time series data (Rohmana, 2013)
As for data processing using EViews software 9. The steps taken in the panel data
regression method are as follows:
1. Determination of the Panel Data Regression Model
In analyzing panel data, it is necessary to test the exact model specifications to
describe the data. Chow test, Hausman test, and lagrange multiplier (LM) test were
carried out (Rohmana, 2013)
2. Classic Assumption Test
According to Basuki & Prawoto (2016) in panel data regression, not all classical
assumption tests need to be done. In this study only use one independent variable,
so there is no need to do multicollinearity tests. Therefore, the classic assumption
test carried out in this study only tested heteroscedasticity only.
3. Hypothesis testing
(a) T-test
Partial test or t-test is done to find out how far the influence of each inde-
pendent variable individually or partially in explaining the variation of the
dependent variable. In the t-test, the calculated t value will be compared
with the t table value, and the Probability will be compared to the error level
determined by the researcher.
Compare the value t count with t critical (t table). The decision to reject or
accept H0 is as follows:
i. If t counts > t table or probability < level of significance (Sig <0.05), then
Ha is accepted and H0 is rejected, the independent variable influences
the dependent variable.
ii. If t count < t table or probability > level of significance (Sig <0.05), then
Ha is rejected and H0 is accepted.
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Table 5: Research Samples.
No Nama of Sharia Bank
1 PT. Bank Aceh Syariah
2 PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia
3 PT. Bank Victoria Syariah
4 PT. Bank BRISyariah
5 PT. Bank Jabar Banten Syariah
6 PT. Bank BNI Syariah
7 PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri
8 PT. Bank Mega Syariah
9 PT. Bank Panin Dubai Syariah
10 PT. Bank Syariah Bukopin
11 PT. BCA Syariah
12 PT. Maybank Syariah Indonesia
13 PT. Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Syariah
No Nama of Sharia Business Unit
14 PT. Bank Danamon Indonesia, Tbk
15 PT. Bank Permata, Tbk
16 PT. Bank Maybank Indonesia, Tbk
17 PT. Bank CIMB Niaga, Tbk
18 PT. Bank OCBC NISP, Tbk
19 PT. Bank Sinarmas
20 PT. Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero), Tbk
21 PT. BPD DKI
22 PT. BPD Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
23 PT. BPD Jawa Tengah
24 PT. BPD Jawa Timur, Tbk
25 PT. BPD Sumatera Utara
26 PT. BPD Jambi
27 PT. BPD Sumatera Barat
28 PT. BPD Riau dan Kepulauan Riau
29 PT. BPD Sumatera Selatan dan Bangka Belitung
30 PT. BPD Kalimantan Selatan
31 PT. BPD Kalimantan Barat
32 PD. BPD Kalimantan Timur
33 PT. BPD Sulawesi Selatan dan Sulawesi Bara
34 PT. BPD Nusa Tenggara Barat
Source: (Statistik Perbankan Syariah, 2017)
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Table 6: Number of Fraud Cases in BUS and UUS from Highest to Lowest.
No Name of Bank BUS/UUS Number of
Fraud Cases
1 Bank Mega Syariah BUS 124
2 Bank Syariah Mandiri BUS 95
3 Bank Muamalat BUS 93
4 BRI syariah BUS 58
5 Bank Victoria Syariah BUS 24
6 Bank Aceh BUS 18
7 BNI syariah BUS 16
8 Bank Panin Syariah BUS 6
9 Bank Jabar Banten Syariah BUS 2
10 BTPN syariah BUS 2
11 BCA syraiah BUS 1
12 Bank Bukopin Syariah BUS 0
13 Bank Maybank Syariah BUS 0
14 BPD Sumatera Utara UUS 36
15 BPD Kalimantan Barat UUS 19
16 BPD Kalimantan Timur UUS 14
17 Bank Tabungan Negara UUS 6
18 BPD DIY UUS 6
19 BPD Jambi UUS 5
20 BPD Sumatera Selatan-Bangka Belitung UUS 5
21 Bank CIMB UUS 4
22 Bank Sinarmas UUS 4
23 BPD Riau-Kepualuan Riau UUS 4
24 BPD Sulawesi Selatan-Sulawesi Barat UUS 4
25 Bank Danamon UUS 3
26 BPD Jaawa Timur UUS 3
27 Bank OCBC UUS 1
28 BPD DKI UUS 1
29 BPD Jawa Tengah UUS 1
30 BPD Sumatera Barat UUS 1
31 BPD Kalimantan Selatan UUS 1
32 BPD NTB UUS 1
33 Bank Permata UUS 0
34 Bank Maybank UUS 0
iii. Determination Coefficient
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The coefficient of determination (R2) shows the ability of the model to
explain the relationship between the independent variable and the depen-
dent variable. Value (R2) will always be between 0 to 1, an R2 of 1 or close
to 1 means that there is a strong influence from the independent variables
that are able to explain the dependent variable, and vice versa (Rohmana,
2013)
4. Results and Discussion
From the results of the analysis carried out by the authors, it turns out that fraud always
occurs every year in each BUS and UUS. Therefore, the writer can conclude that there
are BUS and UUS which have the highest number of Fraud cases and also the lowest
during the 2012-2016 period. When sorted it will look like in the table below.
The table above provides information that among all BUS the number of fraud cases
occurred mostly in the Mega syariah bank with a total of 124 cases and for BUS that did
not experience Fraud were entirely in the Bukopin Sharia bank and Islamic Maybank.
Whereas among all UUS, BPD Sumatra utara has the highest number of fraud cases
with 36 cases. It is inversely proportional to the UUS of the Permata bank and the UUS
of the Maybank bank which have no Fraud cases at all.
The implementation of sharia corporate governance in Islamic banking will be pre-
sented in the following table.
Table 7: Results of Sharia Corporate Governance.
No Name BUS-UUS Year Composit Value Category
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No Name BUS-UUS Year Composit Value Category
2016 2,1 Good










6 BNI syariah 2012 2,4 Good









8 Mega Syariah 2012 1,4 Very good
2013 1,3 Very good
2014 1,3 Very good
2015 1,3 Very good
2016 1,3 Very good
9 Panin Syariah 2012 1,7 Good
2013 1,4 Very good
2014 1,4 Very good
2015 1,4 Very good
2016 1,4 Very good





11 BCA syariah 2012 1,7 Good
2013 1,8 Good
2014 1,8 Good
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No Name BUS-UUS Year Composit Value Category
2015 1,9 Good
2016 2,0 Good










14 Danamon 2012 1,6 Good
2013 1,6 Good
2014 1,4 Very good
2015 1,4 Very good
2016 1,4 Very good





16 Maybank 2012 1,8 Good
2013 1,4 Very good
2014 1,4 Very good
2015 1,5 Good
2016 1,7 Good










19 Sinarmas 2012 1,9 Good
2013 1,9 Good
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2016 1,4 Very good















27 BPD Sumatera Barat 2012 1,1 Very good
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No Name BUS-UUS Year Composit Value Category
2013 1,1 Very good
2014 1,1 Very good
2015 1,1 Very good
2016 1,1 Very good






















32 BPD Kalimantan Timur 2012 2,3 Good
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No Name BUS-UUS Year Composit Value Category
From the table above, the implementation of corporate governance sharia in BUS and
UUS in Indonesia is categorized into 3 categories: very good, acceptable, and good.
The results of subsequent studies of existing data related to the variables in this
study and then processed and analyzed using a panel data regression model to obtain
the following equation:
Based on the above model, it can be explained that each increase in X1 (SCG) is zero,
then the fraud variable is 4.656643. Meanwhile, when the SGG variable increases by 1
unit, the number of frauds will decrease by 21 cases.
After conducting the panel data regression analysis, to find out whether the estimation
obtained has been BLUE (Best Linear Unbias Estimator), the classical assumption is
tested which includes heterosensitivity test. The test results show that the variables in
this study are free from the problem of testing the classical assumptions.
4.1. Testing and discussion of the research hypothesis
In this study, hypothesis testing is done by t-test. The value of t table in this study is
obtained from the table of distribution t and α and degree of freedom (df), where df =
nk = 170 - 2 = 168, then with df 168 and α = 5% (0.05) obtained t table amounting to
1.65397. Furthermore, the value of t table will be compared with the value of t count to
determine the decision to accept Ho or reject Ho. Based on the results of testing using
the Eviews program, it is explained in the following discussion of the t-test
Table 8: Results of Sharia Corporate Governance Tests Against Fraud Prevention.
Variabel Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Decision Significance
SCG -21.78220 57.82159 -0.376714 0.7070 H0 accepted Non significance
Based on Table 8 shows that the value of t counts (-0.37) because in the analysis of
t count (±) is considered absolute, then t arithmetic is (0.38) smaller than t table (1.653)
which means accepting Ho and rejecting Ha. Then the probability level of 0.7070 is
greater than α = (0.05) so it can be concluded that sharia corporate governance has no
significant effect on Fraud prevention.
The results of this study state that the application of sharia corporate governance
does not affect the prevention of fraud. Based on the theory that the implementation
of corporate governance is a very important thing to create an effective and efficient
business. But it turns out that even good governance still has a gap to be able to do
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Fraud. Sharia corporate governance has not been realized optimally in preventing fraud,
because sharia corporate governance depends on the competencies possessed by
internal organs, meaning that every internal organ of Islamic banks must have multiple
competencies, namely in terms of banking and business, because the activities of
Islamic banks are activities that apply banking principles to the principles of equality
(Akmal, 2008).
In addition to having multiple competencies, the implementation of organizational
culture owned by each Islamic bank must also be strengthened again because the
results of a strong culture will increase consistent behavior that can create organizational
effectiveness. If an organizational culture does not provide a positive thing for the
organization, the results that will be achieved or organizational performance will be bad,
because the corporate culture informs employees about how the employee’s behavior
should be (Ikhsan, 2016)
Another thing that must be considered in preventing fraud is the tone at the top
where tone at the top is the atmosphere created by the leadership of the organization.
This means that every attitude shown by the organization’s leadership will certainly
have an effect on its employees. If the tone created by the leader upholds ethics and
integrity, then employees will tend to uphold the same values. But on the contrary, if
investors are not concerned with ethics, then employees will be more prone to fraud
because they feel that ethical behavior is not the main priority in the organization. In
short, tone at the top is that employees will do exactly the same thing their leaders do
(https://www.acfe.com).
This research was supported by In’airat (2015) which stated that the existence and
application of corporate governance were not enough to reduce the level of fraud. In line
with the research of Rahmayani & Rahmawaty (2017) that Islamic corporate governance
with the proxy of the implementation of DPS duties and responsibilities does not affect
the indication of Fraud.
5. Conclusion
Based on the results of the research and discussion above, it can be concluded that
the implementation of sharia corporate governance in Islamic banks in Indonesia 2012-
2016 is divided into 3 parts, which are very good, good, and acceptable. but the average
implementation of sharia corporate governance is good.
The implementation of sharia corporate governance in Islamic banking is not enough
to prevent the occurrence of fraud. Where the implementation of good governance is
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still there is a gap for someone to do Fraud. Because currently, DPS can only supervise
sharia banking in terms of its products, whether it is appropriate or not with sharia
principles. Fraud prevention and control should be a part of DPS’s responsibility because
its existence is expected to be able to focus on developing and guarding so that the
products and activities of the sharia financial institutions that they supervise always run
in accordance with the sharia but due to the limited time, effort and knowledge of DPS
members it escapes management ( Jabbar, 2010).
Sharia corporate governance has not been realized optimally in preventing fraud,
because sharia corporate governance depends on the competencies possessed by
internal organs, meaning that every internal organ of Islamic banks must have multiple
competencies, namely in terms of banking and business, because the activities of
Islamic banks are activities that apply banking principles to the principles of equality
(Akmal, 2008).
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